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Violent Neighborhoods,
Violent Kids
Marcia R. Chaiken
Faced with precipitously rising rates of
youth violence in the Nation's Capital, the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) in 1995 funded congressionally mandated research on juvenile violence in the District of Columbia. The research was intended to examine this trend
and recommend potential means for reducing violence among youth in DC. One part
of the research, carried out by The Urban
Institute, focused on identifying where and
when violence involving children was
taking place in the District. Other studies, completed by the Institute of Law and
Justice (ILJ), sought to describe DC's juvenile justice system and to examine the characteristics of children in three areas in
the city identified by The Urban Institute
as having the highest rates of juvenile
homicide and violence.
This Bulletin presents the findings of
research conducted by LINC 1 which examined the types of delinquent behavior
found among boys living in the three mos t
violent neighborhoods in DC and the
1

LINC is a small interdisc iplinary research center
found ed in 1989 and based in Alexandria, VA. Recent
and ongoing LINC proj ects include evaluations of health
services programs for underserved children, subs tance
abuse prevention programs, and programs for hard-toreach populations. LINC has also completed research
on law enforcement tactics and community actions for
reducing crime and supporting sound child and adolescent development.

role of basic institutions such as families, schools, churches, and youthserving organizations in those boys' lives.
As set forth in detail below, the findings of
LINC's research (referred to in this Bulletin as "the LINC Study" or "the study") are
based on statistical analyses of data collected by ILJ in interviews with a random
sample of boys. Findings are also based on
LINC's interviews of administrators and
staff members of national youth-serving
organizations with regional offices in DC
and local organizations that receive
funds for delinquency prevention. Written
materials provided by these organizations
were also used as sources of information.
The LINC study was based on theory and
prior research from two scientific disciplines: criminology and youth development. Criminologists recognize that although many people, including children,
break laws, only a few become persistent
offenders who commit numerous serious
crimes. Research on youth development
indicates that even under the worst conditions, many children and adolescents are
resilient and, given an opportunity to
learn and practice social skills, most can
become productive and self-sufficient
adults. The LINC research concentrated on
determining the characteristics of the DC
boys who were delinquent and identifying
resources for social skill building available
to these boys.

From the Administrator
Delinquency poses a serious challenge to virtually every major American city. This Bulletin features findings
from the LINC study that describe the
characteristics of delinquent males in
our Nation's Capital and the resources
available to them.
Finding little difference between
serious, violent juvenile offenders in
the District of Columbia and those in
other cities, the author argues that
existing national research can serve
as a catalyst for new initiatives to
reduce juvenile violence in the District.
Indeed, since the LINC research was
completed, the District has reorganized
its funding delivery system for juvenile
justice and delinquency prevention
efforts. As a result, enhanced Federal
and local resources will be available for
youth-serving agencies to develop new
policies, practices, and service delivery
programs. OJJDP and other Federal
agencies are partnering with the
District to provide technical assistance
and other resources as it designs and
implements an improved juvenile
justice system.
Thus, while this Bulletin presents some
disturbing findings about the nature
and incidence of juvenile delinquency
in the District of Columbia, it also offers
considerable hope for the future.
John J. Wilson
Acting Administrator

The nature of many of LINC's findings
will not surprise practitioners, policymakers, and researchers familiar with patterns of juvenile violence and the deep
problems plaguing the Nation's Capital.
LINC found, for instance, that the majority
of adolescent boys in the study sample
have basic needs that are unmet. Many are
unsupervised and unsupported by families, schools, and community organizations that could teach them skills needed
to lead productive lives. The most seriously delinquent boys, the study found,
are alienated-even from other youth in
the neighborhood-and struggling to earn
money (both legally and illegally).
LINC also found several barriers to effective delivery of youth services in DC. Unlike
many cities that have made progress fightIng juvenile violence, DC has too few adults
actively working with and guiding youth in
its most dangerous neighborhoods. Given
significant cuts in funding and other resources, youth-serving organizations in DC
have been forced to compete for the scarce
resources that remain available.
Notwithstanding such discouraging
findings, LINC believes that conditions in
DC-even in the worst neighborhoodscan improve. It found, for example, that a
large percentage (22 percent) of adolescent boys in violent neighborhoods in DC
resist committing any criminal acts. Even
among boys who are delinquent, most
limit themselves to relatively less serious
patterns of delinquency (i.e., theft and
other property crimes or occasional
fights). Some of the most seriously delinquent children in DC (e.g., those who have
committed a robbery) 2 are reaching out to
adults for guidance. LINC also found that
hundreds of adults living in DC are willing
to be trained to meet the basic developmental needs of delinquent youth.
The findings of the LINC study and LINC's
subsequent comparison of DC with other
cities in the Nation raise several policy implications. To involve more adults in youth
development and improve conditions for
youth in DC, the District will need to devote
additional resources to the development of
leadership, coordination, and strategic planning for youth. Based on studies of other
cities' responses to crime, violence, and
juvenile delinquency, LINC suggests specific
actions that need to be taken for DC to address, and eventually reduce, problems with
crime, violence, and juvenile delinquency.
Such seriously delinquent children also typically
commit many burglaries, assaults, or other property
crimes, or are involved in selling drugs.

2

Study Design
and Methods
The LINC Study was accomplished
through the use of two main research
methods: analysis of self-reported data
and analysis of data concerning youth
services available in DC.
Each research method is described in
detail below.

Analysis of Self-Reported
Data
Research staff from Howard University
and ILJ administered a lengthy questionnaire to a random sample of 213 boys who,
in the summer of 1996, were living in one
of the three census tracts in Washington,
DC, identified as having the highest rates
of juvenile violence during the previous
3 years. 3 The sample, the questionnaire,
and LINC's analysis of the boys' responses
are described below.
The sample. The random sample included 213 boys ages 13 to 17, 98 percent
of whom identified themselves as black
or African American. ILJ and Howard
University's process of recruiting boys for
interviews and selecting the study sample
involved several steps. First, a team of researchers from Howard University in mid1996 canvassed the three census tracts and
completed a form describing the physical
conditions (for example, presence of graffiti
or trash) of each block face .4 They also
interviewed a member of each household
to identify any boys living there between
the ages of 13 and 17. Team members generally operated in pairs and discussed the
project with whoever answered the door.
In particular, they asked about the number
and ages of boys in the household, explained
the $15 payment available to any eligible
youth who successfully completed an interview (pointing out that only one boy per
household could participate), and distributed a flier about the project.
This approach succeeded in letting the
community know about the survey; however, information about the number of boys
in each household was generally not forthcoming. Community members were suspicious of the team's inquiries and frequently
informed team members that no eligible
' A description of the methods used to identify these
census tracts appears in The Urban Institute's 1997
report Patterns of Violent Crimes Committed Against
Juveniles in the District of Columbia (Gouvis, Johnson,
and Roth, 1997).
'The term "block face" refers to one side of a street
between two cross·streets or intersections.
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boys lived in their households (even when
accepting the flier and asking questions
about the interview process). As a supplemental approach to the canvass, key members of the Howard University research
team provided fliers to community activists, businesses, and churches in the three
census tracts.
Researchers eventually interviewed
295 boys, either in their homes or at community centers. Of these, seven were unable
to complete the interview process because
of cognitive impairment. Interviewers used
a seven-item Short Blessed Scale Exam
(Katzman, Brown, and Fuld, 1983) to assess
cognitive ability. Seventy-five of the remaining 288 who completed the interview had to
be excluded from analysis. Primary reasons
for exclusion were that a respondent was
not from one of the three census tracts or
that a respondent was from the same household as another respondent. Other reasons
included a refusal to answer key sections of
the questionnaire, an interviewer's judgment
that answers were untruthful, and disruptive
behavior during the interview.
As reflected in figure 1, the 213 boys
in the sample can be classified into five
groups, based on the types of criminal behavior, if any, they reported committing.
Classification of the boys according to the
type of criminal behavior committed was
carried out using methods developed by
the author (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1984)
that have been replicated by numerous
researchers (Johnson eta!., 1985). The
classifications were as follows: 5
+ Good kids (21.6 percent). Close to onequarter of boys in the study sample reported committing no delinquent acts
(acts which if committed by adults would
be crimes), and most (70 percent) of
these "good kids" reported committing
no other juvenile offenses. However,
30 percent of the good kids reported having committed one or more noncriminal
status offenses (such as drinking alcohol
or running away from home during the
6 months prior to their interview).

+

5

Fighters (19.2 percent). This group of
boys, called fighters, reported committing assaults but no other crimes. Each
fighter reported committing, on average,
slightly more than two assaults each
year. Representing 19.2 percent of the
sample, the fighters reported that they

The names used for categories of juveniles in this Bulletin were developed as part of the DC study and are based
on, but not Identical to, the names used for categories of
adult offenders In Varieties of Criminal Behavior (Chaiken
and Chaiken, 1982).

Figure 1: Types of Delinquent Behavior Among Adolescent Boys in
Three Violent DC Neighborhoods
Dealers
(No robbery or property crime)

4.7%

Robbers
(Also likely to commit
property and drug
offenses and assaults)

reported by boys in previous studies, suggesting that the DC boys were neither more
nor less truthful than other boys interviewed about delinquent acts or other juvenile offenses they might have committed.
The questionnaire sought information
on the following subjects:

+

Personal matters, including age, race,
and ethnicity; whether the boys had
fathered children or been responsible
for any pregnancies; what schools they
attended; and whether they held a job.

+

Participation in afterschool activities, including school programs or clubs, athletics, youth organizations, religious groups,
or any other community activities.

+

Adult supervision received (especially
during afterschool hours).

+

Emotions, including any feelings of
isolation.
Involvement in crime, delinquency, or
gangs (during lifetime and within the 6month period prior to the interview).

Property
offenders

7.0%

31.9%

.,,.,.,.I~~
.
.-. 15.5%
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.
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Fighters
(Just assaults)
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Good kids
(No criminal acts)

19.2%

21.6%
Note: Detail may not total 100% because of rounding error.

did not steal or use force to take other
people's money or other possessions.
Nor were they involved in selling drugs
or significantly more likely than good
kids to commit noncriminal offenses.

+

+

Dealers (4.7 percent). A small percentage of the boys in the sample were
considered to be dealers, meaning that
they reported committing no crimes
other than selling drugs and occasionally getting into fights. 6 Dealers as a
group were responsible for only a
small fraction (less than 2 percent) of
drug sales made by the boys in the
sample. On average, each dealer reported selling drugs slightly more than
once every other month.
Property offenders (31.9 percent). This
group reported committing property
offenses such as burglary and auto theft
but was not involved in drug selling.

+

Property offenders/drug dealers (15.5
percent). This group includes those
boys who reported committing property offenses and dealing drugs.

+

Robbers (J percent). The final group,
the most criminal of those in the study
sample, includes boys who reported
committing a spectrum of crimes, including robbery.

6

Only a few (three) of the dealers reported getting
into lights.

The questionnaire. In mid-1996, Howard
University and ILJ research staff conducted
one-on-one interviews of each boy in the
study sample. During these interviews,
which typically lasted 2'/,hours, theresearchers administered a lengthy and
detailed questionnaire and recorded each
boy's answers to the questions.' The 70page questionnaire, written and designed
by Drs. Beverly R. Fletcher and Louis E.
Wright, Jr., of Howard University, incorporated items from questionnaires previously
designed and fielded as part of OJJDPfunded studies of delinquent behavior,
including a parallel effort completed in
Los Angeles, CA. 8 The results of reliability
analysis indicated that boys in the study
sample responded in a consistent and
truthful manner. 9 In addition, the patterns
of delinquency and other offenses reported
by DC boys closely resembled those
'For additional information on the questionnaire and
the methods used to select the sample and administer
the questionnaire, refer to McEwen (1998).
8

Two directors of past and ongoing studies, Dr. David
Huizinga of the Institute for Behavior Sciences (University of Colorado) and Dr. Cheryl Maxson of the University of Southern California, served as advisers to Drs.
Fletcher and Wright and reviewed drafts of the survey
as it was being designed and pretested.
'Most reliability scales, as reflected by Cronbach 's
alpha, were consistent between the two studies and
were generally greater than 0. 70.
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+

Data analysis. After research staff administered and recorded answers to the
questionnaires, LINC analyzed the boys'
responses. The primary statistical methods used to analyze responses were descriptive techniques (such as generating
measures of dispersion and central tendency) and analysis of variance. LINC used
the latter method to determine whether
differences between the groups of boys in
the study sample were real or simply the
result of chance. This Bulletin reports only
those findings that are statistically significant at the 5-percent level or better (meaning that at least 95 percent of the time, differences are not due to chance).

Analysis of Youth
Services Data
The second research method utilized in
LINC's study was the analysis of information concerning youth services available in
DC. LINC gathered this information in two
ways: by interviewing administrators and
staff of youth-serving organizations and by
reviewing documentation provided by
these organizations. The types of organizations contacted and the procedures used
to secure information are described below.
Organizations contacted. When selecting organizations, LINC's primary source
was the Resource Directory of Youth Services
in the District of Columbia (prepared in July
1994 by the Mayor's Youth Initiative),
which lists and describes 618 programs
for DC youth. Seventy-two programs in the

directory defined their purpose as delinquency prevention. Of these, 40 programs
administered or provided services only to
adjudicated youth or those awaiting trial,
4 programs provided drug treatment or
drug prevention services, and 8 either provided no direct services or served only children under age 13 or adults. Of the 20 remaining delinquency prevention programs,
LINC selected 12 that represented 3 types of
youth-serving organizations:

and approaches available for youth at high
risk of committing or becoming victims of
violent acts, especially youth living in the
three study areas. Researchers also sought
information on coordination between the
organizations and government agencies or
nonprofit groups in DC. ILJ staff collected
additional information about the status of
youth services by conducting a telephone
survey to update the Resource Directory
discussed above.

+

Gathering written materials. In addition to seeking verbal responses from administrators during interviews and calls,
LINC asked about the availability of written
materials on such issues as geographic
areas served, programmatic activities provided, participant characteristics, and coalitions with which the organizations were
working. At the end of each interview, LINC
reviewed with the respondent a list of written materials to be furnished. Materials
were then either provided immediately or
mailed to LINC.

+

+

Affiliates of national organizations
specifically geared to youth, including
the Camp Fire Potomac Area Council,
4-H/Youth Programs, Cooperative
Extension Service for the District of
Columbia, Girl Scouts of the Nation's
Capital, Boys & Girls Clubs of the
Chesapeake/Potomac Region, the
National Capital Area Council of Boy
Scouts of America, Big Sisters of the
Washington Metropolitan Area, and Big
Brothers of the National Capital Area.
Affiliates of national organizations
whose broader missions include youth
services, including the YMCA of Metropolitan DC and Associated Catholic
Charities' Family and Youth Services.
Local youth organizations, including
the Metropolitan Police Boys & Girls
Clubs and the Sasha Bruce Network.

Although the number of organizations
contacted was far from exhaustive, these
12 organizations were representative of the
types of organizations then offering delinquency prevention programs and youth
development and social skills activities to
DC adolescents who had not necessarily
been adjudicated. LINC's research focused
on programs that DC teens could choose
to participate in rather than those that
youth were ordered (by a court) to
participate in.

Interviewing administrators and staff.
LINC collected data about youth services
in DC in a series of structured telephone
calls and in-person interviews with 20 administrators and staff members of the
youth-serving organizations selected.
When conducting these calls and interviews, the author used structured protocols, which listed questions to ask and
specified a way to record responses
consistently. Respondents, however, were
encouraged to provide information in a
conversational mode rather than a didactic format. Telephone interviews lasted on
average 30 minutes, and in-person interviews lasted on average 1 hour.
In gathering information on youth-serving
organizations, LINC focused on programs

Findings
The findings in this study fall into
three broad categories: patterns of delinquency, supervision and activities of
the boys during and after school, and
barriers to effective delivery of youth

services in DC. Findings under each
category are presented below.

Patterns of Delinquency
Even among the relatively homogeneous group of boys in the study sample
(all adolescent boys from three predominantly poor and predominantly African
American DC neighborhoods), the study
found significant distinctions based on the
type of delinquency, if any, the boys were
involved in and additional characteristics.
In examining patterns of delinquency, the
LINC study considered both the level of
involvement in delinquency (delinquency
category) and the effect of the following
factors: drug dealing, age, employment,
feelings of social isolation, gang membership, and substance abuse.
LINC's findings reveal patterns of delinquency among adolescent boys in DC that
are very similar to those among youth in
other cities. Consistent with the findings of
previous research, for example, LINC
found that a small percentage of offenders
are responsible for a large proportion of
the crime in DC's most violent neighborhoods (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972;
Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; and Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998). As explained in greater detail
in the "Comparative Analysis" section of

Figure 2: Percentage of All Juvenile Offenses Committed by
Different Groups
Fighters
2.4%
Dealers
3.0%

Good kids
1.4%

Property offenders
27.9%

Robbers
36.2%

Property offenders/Drug dealers
29.1%
Note: Juvenile offenses include both delinquent acts (which are crimes if committed by
adults) and status offenses (such as drinking and truancy).
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Figure 3: Percentage of All Assaults Committed by Different Groups
During the 6 Months Preceding the Study
Property offenders/Drug
dealers
4.6%

Dealers
4.4%

Fighters

10.6%

Property
offenders

60.0%
20.5%

Note: Good kids category is not included because the group (by definition) does not engage in
delinquent activities, including assault. Detail may not total 100% because of rounding error.

Figure 4: Percentage of Drug Deals Committed by Different Groups
During the 6 Months Preceding the Interview
Dealers

5.5%

Robbers
44.0%

Property
offenders/Drug dealers

50.5%

Note: Good kids, fighters, and property offenders are not included because these groups (by
definition) do not deal drugs.

this Bulletin, however, DC's responses to
juvenile crime and violence were found to
differ significantly from those implemented
in other cities that have successfully reduced levels of juvenile crime and violence.

Delinquency category. LINC found that
a large proportion of the crime in the three
study neighborhoods was committed by a
small percentage of boys in the sample. In
particular, it found that the robber category

(representing only 7 percent of boys in
the sample) was responsible for 36.2 percent of all reported delinquent acts in the
three study neighborhoods (figure 2).
This same small group committed close to
one-fourth (20.5 percent) of all juvenile
assaults in the three neighborhoods (figure 3). Fighters, by contrast, committed
only 10.6 percent of juvenile assaults.
The data also showed that robbers on

5

average assaulted 12 people each year
(about 6 times as many as the fighters).
As shown in figure 4, boys in the robber category were responsible for close
to half (44 percent) of all drug deals committed by boys in the study sample during the 6-month period preceding the
study. The robbers also committed almost half (44 percent) of all property
crimes completed by boys in the sample
during the same time period.

Drug dealing. In examining patterns of
delinquency, the LINC study found that most
boys involved in selling drugs were less violent than those engaged in other criminal
activities. 1°Consistent with prior research,
the study also found that many different
types of youth (as opposed to any one stereotypical drug dealer) are involved in selling drugs (Chaiken and Johnson, 1988).
While the dealers, as noted above, reported committing assaults infrequently,
property offenders/drug dealers reported
being very active offenders, with each
on average committing more than 55 delinquent acts during the 6-month period
preceding the interview. This group,
however, committed approximately 50percent fewer assaults than the fighters
and approximately 60-percent fewer assaults than the dealers.
The category responsible for the greatest number of violent crimes in the study
neighborhoods was the property offenders.
These boys-who do not deal drugs but are
involved in theft, auto theft, vandalism, and
other property crimes-represented about
one-third (31.9 percent) of all boys interviewed and reported committing, on average, eight assaults or other violent crimes
each year. While the property offenders
committed fewer crimes on average than
the robbers (most of whom commit more
than 80 each year), they outnumber the
robbers by about 4 to 1 and therefore, as a
group, commit many more acts of violence.
In addition, property offenders as a group
were found to commit a total of about twice
as many property offenses as the property
offenders/drug dealers.
10
Note that this section describes findings on all boys
who reported dealing drugs (whether dealers, property offenders/drug dealers, or robbers). The "dealers"
category, by contrast, includes boys in the sample
whose only reported criminal activity was drug dealing. Therefore, even though most robbers reported
being very active drug sellers, they are considered
robbers rather than dealers, because their reported
criminal activity involves a whole spectrum of crimes,
including robbery.

Table 1 : Percentage of Boys Who
Reported Holding a Job,
by Delinquency Category
Delinquency
Category
Good kids
Dealers
Fighters
Property offenders
Property offenders/
Drug dealers
Robbers

Percentage
With a Job
23.9%
20
22
26.5
48.5
60

Although most boys in the study who dealt
drugs-whether dealers, property offenders/
drug dealers, or robbers-committed significantly fewer assaults than nondealers
(with the notable exception of the robbers),
they carried weapons more frequently.n
Because those dealing drugs were more
likely to carry weapons, assaults involving
these boys were more likely to have lethal
outcomes than those involving boys who
used only their hands, feet, or a blunt instrument (Felson and Messner, 1996). This
finding supports the view of many researchers that although drug dealing may not
directly cause higher overall rates of violence, it results in youth arming themselves
and, as a result, causes higher homicide
rates (Blumstein, 1996).
Age. Even among adolescent boys, age
was found to make a difference. The study
found, for example, that the least delinquent boys (the good kids) were the
youngest (with a median age of 14.65) and
the most delinquent (the robbers) were
the oldest (with a median age of 15.83).
Employment. Overall, 30 percent of the
boys interviewed for the study reported
having a job during the school year. 12 As
shown in table 1, the most seriously delinquent boys were the most likely to report
having a jobP
Social isolation. Like many adolescents,
boys in the study sample were likely to
report feeling different from or isolated
11
As used in this Bulletin, the term "weapon" includes
firearms (handguns, rifles, or shotguns) and knivesbut not rocks, bottles, fists, or feet.

from their peers. More than half (52.6 percent) agreed with the statement, "I usually
keep to myself because I am not like other
people my age." The most seriously delinquent boys were most likely to agree with
this statement, with 77 percent of the robbers agreeing or strongly agreeing with it
and none strongly disagreeing. By contrast,
less than half (41.4 percent) of the fighters
agreed with the statement, and 20 percent strongly disagreed. Although adolescents typically have concerns about fitting in, the robbers seemed to have more
extreme concerns.
Gang membership. While stories about
gang wars dramatically portrayed by the
media may suggest that gang membership
is rampant in high-crime neighborhoods in
the United States, 14 only 15 percent of boys
in this study reported ever having joined
a gang. The likelihood of joining a gang
was somewhat higher for the more delinquent boys. Less than 9 percent of the
good kids and the fighters had ever
joined a gang, compared with one-third
of the robbers. Dealers were also likely
to have been gang members, with 30 percent reporting gang membership at some
time.
Consistent with findings in other cities,
this study showed that gang membership
in the three neighborhoods examined lasted
a relatively short time (between 1 and 2
years) (Loeber, Huizinga, and Thornberry,
1996). Of the boys who reported ever having joined a gang, only 4.2 percent reported
still being members at the time they were
interviewed.
The study also found that neither the
length of time that a boy belonged to a gang
nor any current gang membership was related to the seriousness of delinquency, if
any, that the boy was committing. Robbers
were no more likely than less delinquent
boys to be current gang members.
Although studies in other cities suggest
that boys commit more crimes when they
belong to gangs (Thornberry and Burch,
1997), this study found that boys who were
still gang members at the time of their interviews committed essentially the same
number of assaults and other crimes in the
weeks immediately before the interview as
did nongang members.

12

Substance abuse. Notwithstanding a
widespread belief that drug use is high
among all adolescents who engage in

13 The study, however, draws no conclusion as to
whether the relationship bEtween employment and
delinquent behavior is coincidental or causal.

14 For recent examples, see Mike Robinson's article,
"Chicago Cop Accused of Running Guns," printed in
The Washington Post on April 16, 1999.

Although the questionnaire did not distinguish between legal and illegal jobs, it asked about employment
in the context of prosocial activities (such as participation in religious activities).

6

delinquent behavior, 15 the use of illegal
drugs (other than marijuana) has played
little part in the pattern of delinquency
among youth in the District. The use of
crack or heroin was rare among boys in the
study sample, as it is for youth in other
cities across the Nation (Riley, 1997).
None of the boys interviewed reported
ever having used psychedelics or hallucinogens, crack or any other type of cocaine, or
heroin. Only five boys (2.3 percent of the
sample) reported having tried phencyclidine
(PCP or "angel dust"), tranquilizers, or barbiturates. One boy stated that he had taken
amphetamines, and one reported prior use
of an inhalant (such as aerosols or glue).
These findings are consistent with research
findings around the country (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997).
Although LINC found that few boys in
the sample used illegal drugs other than
marijuana, it found that a relatively high
proportion used alcohol and/or marijuana.
Approximately 30 percent of the study
sample reported drinking beer or wine
without adult permission, 18 percent reported drinking hard liquor without adult
permission, and approximately one-third
reported using marijuana.
Alcohol and marijuana use was found to
be much more prevalent among seriously
delinquent boys (table 2). Only 7 percent
of the good kids and 7 percent of the fighters reported drinking hard liquor without
adult permission, compared with 12 percent of the property offenders, 30 percent
of the dealers, 39 percent of the property
offenders/drug dealers, and 60 percent of
the robbers. Overall, a greater number of
boys reported drinking wine or beer without adult permission than hard liquor, and
once again, the more delinquent boys were
more likely to do so. Slightly more than
10 percent of the good kids and fighters,
approximately one-third of the dealers and
property offenders, and more than half of
the property offender/drug dealers and
robbers reported drinking beer or wine
without adult permission.
Similarly, marijuana use was reported
by 11 percent of the good kids, 27 percent
15 For example, the preamble to the National Governors' Association (NGA) Policy Statement on Juvenile
Crime and Delinquency Prevention Programs and Principles states, "Delinquency, particularly drug· and gunrelated violence, is escalating at a disturbing rate.
Young people are killing each other. Children are terrorizing their schools, parks, and neighborhoods.
Young people are either the loot soldiers or ringleaders in criminal enterprises involved in drug trafficking"
(National Governors' Association, 1999).

in these groups responsible for a pregnancy). Fighters, the least likely to drink,
were also the least likely to report having
gotten a girl pregnant (only 7.3 percent reported being responsible for a pregnancy).

Supervision and Activities

of the property offenders, 70 percent of
the property offenders/drug dealers, and
80 percent of the robbers. The dealers
reported the greatest use of marijuana, at
90 percent; the fighters reported the least
use, at 7 percent.
Although the study generally found a
strong association between using hard liquor or marijuana and committing delinquent acts generally (with boys who used
hard liquor committing a significantly
greater number of all types of delinquent
acts, including violent crimes, and those
who used marijuana committing more property crimes and drug deals), it found no such
relationship between the use of marijuana
and the commission of violent crimes. Marijuana users, for example, reported committing more assaults, on average, than the
boys who did not use marijuana, but these
differences were not statistically significant.

nated a girl. Of these, 58 percent reported
having used marijuana. Marijuana users
were more than twice as likely to get a girl
pregnant as nonusers: by their own report,
8 percent of the nonusers and approximately 20 percent of the users had been
responsible for a pregnancy. Findings for
boys who reported drinking beer or wine
without adult permission were almost the
same as for boys who reported using marijuana. Nineteen percent of those who had
used beer or wine without adult permission (and only 9 percent of those who had
not) were responsible for a pregnancy.

The LINC study also found that drinking
alcohol (of any type) without adult permission or using marijuana increased a boy's
likelihood of getting a girl pregnant.
Slightly more than 12 percent of the boys
interviewed said that they had impreg-

Considering the different delinquency
categories of boys in the study sample,
dealers were the most likely to cause a
pregnancy (30 percent responsible for a
pregnancy), closely followed by property
offenders and robbers (27 percent of boys

Table 2:

The likelihood of getting a girl pregnant
was even greater for boys who drank hard
liquor. Although less than 9 percent of
those who did not drink hard liquor reported getting a girl pregnant, 28 percent
of the boys who drank hard liquor were
responsible for a pregnancy.

Perce~tage of Boys Who Reported Using Hard Liquor or Marijuana,
by Delinquency Category

Delinquency
Category
Good kids
Dealers
Fighters
Property offenders
Property offenders/
Drug dealers
Robbers

Percentage Who Drank
Hard Liquor

Percentage Who Used
Marijuana
11%

7%

30
7
12

90
7
27

39
60

70
80
7

The Urban Institute's previous analysis
of youth crime focused on when and where
offenses by DC youth were taking place
(Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's
analysis, by contrast, sought to understand
the nature and extent of supervision received by boys in areas where youth crime
was relatively rampant and determine what
policy implications arose from the study's
findings on supervision. In considering how
boys in the study sample were occupied
during and after school, LINC examined
activities that the boys participated in
and programs available to them through
schools and youth-serving organizations
in the community. LINC's findings on supervision and activities are presented in the
following sections.
Adult supervision after school. Boys in
the study sample reported having adults in
their lives who care about them and want
to be there for them. Ninety-two percent
reported having an adult other than a parent who cares "a lot" about them, and
more than one-quarter (28 percent) named
a caring adult in their lives (other than a
member of their immediate family) as the
adult to whom they felt closest. For most,
this adult was either a godparent or a
member of the boy's extended family (e.g.,
a grandparent or other close relative).
The next most frequently mentioned person was an adult acting as a mentor. Several boys named leaders in local youth organizations as caring adults.
Notwithstanding the presence of caring
adults in their lives, boys in DC are most
likely to encounter violence-as either
offenders or victims-during the hours immediately before and after school (Gouvis,
Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's findings,
based on its interviews of boys in the study
sample, suggest one probable cause for violence during these hours: lack of adult
supervision. In particular, LINC found that
the vast majority of boys (75 percent)
spend the afterschool hours unsupervised
by an adult 1 or more days each week, and
almost half (48 percent) never receive adult
supervision during the afterschool hours.
The relatively few boys who reported
being supervised by an adult every day
after school (23 percent of the sample)
tended to be less delinquent than those
who received little or no adult supervision

in the afterschool hours. Forty percent of
the good kids-as opposed to 20 percent
of the robbers-were supervised by an
adult every day after school.
For boys in the study sample, spending the afterschool hours in a location
known to their parents or guardians was
even more important than spending that
time with an adult present. Of the good
kids, only 8. 7 percent reported that their
primary caregiver rarely or never knew
where they were during the afterschool
hours. By contrast, 15 percent of the
fighters, 18 percent of property offender/
drug dealers, 22 percent of property
offenders, 30 percent of the dealers, and
33 percent of the robbers reported having primary caregivers who rarely or
never knew where they were during that
time period.

Afterschool activities. Boys in the
study sample reported participating in different types of afterschool activities. LINC
considered the relationship, if any, between participation in these activities and
the likelihood that a boy would become
involved in delinquency.
Athletics. Fifty-two percent of boys
in the sample reported participating in
sports during the afterschool hours. The
sports most frequently mentioned by boys
were football (35 percent participated) and
basketball (17 percent participated). The
study showed no relationship, however,
between participation in these or any
other sports and the likelihood that a boy
would become involved in delinquency. In
other words, good kids, fighters, dealers,
property offenders, property offenders/
drug dealers, and robbers were equally
likely to participate in athletic activities.
Participation in school sports appeared
to have one positive effect. The number of
drug deals made by boys participating in
sports was significantly lower than the number made by nonparticipants. Football players, in particular, were less likely to sell
drugs than boys who did not play football,
with 19 percent of football players and 29
percent of nonfootball players reporting that
they sold drugs. On the other hand, delinquent boys who played school basketball
reported committing, on average, almost
four times more property crimes than those
who did not play school basketball and
twice as many delinquent acts overall as
nonbasketball players. While less involved
in drug dealing, football players reported
committing, on average, approximately
twice as many property crimes as boys who
did not play football. 16 Although football

players reported committing more assaults
than boys who did not play football, the
differences were not significant.

Music groups. Approximately 10 percent of boys in the sample reported participating in a school band or choir during
the afterschool hours. Good kids were
slightly more likely to participate in these
activities than the more delinquent boys:
approximately 17 percent of good kids
participated, compared with 10 percent
of fighters and dealers and 6 percent of
property offenders. No difference in rates
of assaults, drug deals, property offenses,
or overall delinquent acts was found based
on a boy's participation in band or choir.
Clubs that focus on building cognitive
or social skills. Almost one-quarter (23.5
percent) of boys in the sample reported
participating in clubs or other organizations that focus on building cognitive,
social, or vocational skills. These groups
included math and computer clubs, radio
and television broadcast clubs, cooking and
catering clubs, art and drama clubs, and
groups that concentrate on promoting civic
responsibility and providing community
services (such as Concerned Black Men and
student government organizations).
Several studies have demonstrated
that afterschool activities designed to increase students' cognitive or social skills
and provide opportunities for community
service are effective at preventing delinquency (Lipsey, 1992; Sherman eta!., 1997;
Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In examining the
16 Like the relationship between employment and delinquent behavior (see footnote 13), the study draws no
conclusion as to whether the relationship between playing football or basketball and committing property
crimes is coincidental or causal.
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effect of these activities and the types of
boys who participated in them, LINC
found that good kids were not significantly more likely to participate in these
activities than boys in the other delinquency categories. LINC also found, however, that boys involved in these clubs
reported fewer delinquent acts, with participants committing, on average, approximately five times fewer property crimes
and six times fewer delinquent acts. Boys
involved in these activities also reported
committing fewer assaults on average, but
participation was not found to be a statistically significant factor in such lower
rates of assault.

Activities available through schools
during school hours. Many cities that
have experienced an increase in youth
violence have implemented school-based
violence prevention programs. 17 According to adolescents in the study sample,
however, very few or no such programs exist in their neighborhood schools. When
asked if they knew of school programs or
services designed to help students solve
problems without violence, approximately
two-thirds answered "no." Of the onethird who reported knowing of such a
program, about half (16 percent of the
total sample) either could not identify a
specific program or named a program that
no one else identified.
Approximately 6 percent of those boys
who knew of a violence prevention program
mentioned the Gang Resistance Education
and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program and substance abuse programs such as DARE. A

17 For reports on different types of school-based violence intervention programs, see Violence in American
Schools (Elliott, Hamburg, and Williams, 1998).

small number of boys mentioned programs
run by particular counselors or teachers,
peer programs, conflict resolution programs,
and mediation. The study found no relationship between boys' identification of schoolbased violence prevention programs and
their level of delinquency.
Suspension and expulsion. Although
youth crime peaks in the afterschool hours,
school hours in DC are also a prime time
for violence, according to The Urban Institute. This has not been true in other cities
(Snyder and Sickmund, 1995). Violence
during school hours, The Urban Institute
found, may not necessarily occur on school
grounds, but in areas surrounding schools
(Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997).
Findings in LINC's study indicate that
high rates of suspension and expulsion in DC
schools may be contributing to high rates
of violence during school hours. The majority of boys in the sample (76 percent), for
example, reported having been suspended
from school at least once. Even among the
good kids, more than half (57 percent)
had been suspended at least once. All of
the dealers and almost all (91 percent)
of the property offenders/drug dealers
had been suspended at least once.
Expulsion rates were also high in the
three study neighborhoods: more than
20 percent of the boys interviewed reported
having been expelled from school. In addition, LINC found a strong association between expulsion and delinquent behavior.
Although only 8 percent of the good kids
and 12 percent of the fighters had been expelled, 40 percent of the dealers and 40 percent of the robbers had been expelled.
For the 6-month period prior to the
interview, the number of delinquent acts
reported by boys who had been suspended was, on average, more than three times
that of boys who had never been suspended. The boys who, at the time of the interview, said that they were not in school
reported committing, on average, more
than four times the number of delinquent
acts during the preceding 6 months as did
the boys who were attending school at the
time of the interview.
Activities available through youthserving organizations. According to written materials provided by youth-serving
organizations, many such organizations in
DC focus on delinquency prevention and
skill building. An update of the 1994
Resource Directory of Youth Services in the
District of Columbia (updated by ILJ for this
study) lists more than 50 organizations in
or adjacent to the three neighborhoods

Table 3: Programs in Study Neighborhoods Available for Children
Program type

Neighborhood 1

Academic
Other educational
Drug abuse only
Drug and alcohol abuse
Substance abuse education
General health
OB/GYN
Health education
Mental health
Life skills/Parenting skills
Crisis intervention
Basic needs
Child care
Recreation
Delinquency prevention
Investigation services
Arts
Other
Total

4

Neighborhood 3

7
3

2

2
1
1
1
1
4
3
4

2
1
3
1
1
1

22

25

examined in this study (table 3). Almost
half of these organizations described themselves as providing services for delinquency prevention or intervention, and
approximately 30 percent specified approaches for supporting the development
of life skills, parenting skills, and other
skills found to prevent delinquency. Only
24 percent of the boys in the study sample
reported participating in the activities
or programs of any such community
organization.
LINC also found that community centers and youth service agencies in the District are failing to engage adolescent boys
in afterschool activities. Although these
centers and agencies constitute approximately one-half of the youth services agencies listed for the neighborhoods in which
the boys lived, less than 4 percent of the
boys said that they had participated in
activities provided by a DC community
center or youth agency.
Eighty percent of boys in the study
sample were unable to name a single neighborhood organization with programs designed to help youth solve problems
without resorting to violence. Less than
4 percent named a community center or
other city youth service organization. Although the resource directory lists several
churches and other religious organizations
in each of the three neighborhoods, only
1 percent of the boys named a church
group. The organization identified by the
9

Neighborhood 2

1
3
1

1
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largest number of boys (9 percent) was
the Boys & Girls Club.
According to the boys' responses, affiliates of national youth organizations (such
as Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boy
Scouts of America, the National 4-H Council, and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America)
reached a substantially greater proportion
of boys than purely local, communitybased organizations. Affiliates, the study
found, provided services to youth in all six
delinquency categories. Although almost
one-half of the boys reported belonging to
or participating in the activities of an organization that may have been a local affiliate of a national youth-serving organization at some time in the past, whether the
organizations were affiliated with a national organization could not be verified.
The organization named by the most boys
(27 percent) was the Boys Club. However,
unlike those in other cities (that are affiliated with the national organization), some
Boys Clubs in DC are independent and
share only the name-and not the programs, services, or staff training-of the
national organization. Moreover, at the
time of their interviews, only 14 percent
of the boys were still Boys Club members.
In recent years, major national youth
organizations, including Boys & Girls Clubs
and others discussed in this section, have
developed programs tailored to reaching
youth in inner-city areas and providing
them with the types of opportunities that

provides skill development programs for
teens in schools located in high-crime
areas. While funding was available, it also
sponsored project HIPS (Helping Individual Prostitutes to Survive), an outreach program for teen prostitutes that
included a 24-hour hotline and a van
sent out on weekend nights (from 10 p.m.
to 6 a.m.) to provide vital information
about available services.

+

+

research has demonstrated help prevent
delinquency and allow youth to develop
skills needed for productive adult lives
(Chaiken, 1998a). According to a previous
LINC survey, national affiliates that provide programs in inner-city neighborhoods
attract far more adolescent participants
than their counterparts in locations
where adolescents are at a lower risk of
delinquency. Moreover, national affiliates
are more likely to operate safely in these
areas when police are responsive to cooperating with them (Chaiken, 1998b).
Efforts of nationally affiliated organizations launched in the DC area are described below. The information is based
on written materials submitted by the
organizations.

+

+

Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Washington has provided outreach programs in
five DC Club locations and in housing
developments located in neighborhoods
with high poverty and crime rates. Programs provided by these affiliates of the
national organizat)on include Keystone
Clubs (designed to present opportunities for teen boys to develop productive
leadership skills) and, until DC funds
were cut, Smart Moves (a delinquency
prevention program for younger adolescents that is firmly grounded in research
on adolescent development).
U.S. Department of Agriculture 4-H
and Youth Development Service, one
of the first national organizations to
base programming for at-risk youth on
research on adolescent development,

Boy Scouts of America, National Capital
Area Council, has made an effort to recruit boys from kindergarten to grade 12
attending schools in underserved neighborhoods. Through this new outreachand longstanding programs such as
Learning for Life-the local Boy Scouts
council provides important opportunities for youth to develop social skills.
Big Brothers of the National Capital
Area sponsors "Bigs in Blue," a volunteer program in which DC Metropolitan
Police officers serve as Big Brothers for
at-risk children in the District.

Barriers to Delivery of
Youth Services
In analyzing data collected from administrators and staff of youth-serving organizations, LINC found two primary barriers
to the effective delivery of youth services
in the District: a lack of coordination between the DC local government and youthserving organizations/agencies in the area
and an excess number of inactive coalitions
intended to head efforts to improve youth
services in DC.

maintained through grants and other nonprofit funding sources, but salaries and
benefits of officers working at the clubs
are paid by the MPD. As DC's budget
shrinks or suffers cuts, services such as
these-dependent on local funds-will
shrink or disappear as well. As part of this
study, IU conducted a survey of youth services available in DC in 1994. By 1996, IU
found, IS percent of the services available
in 1994 (92 out of 620) had vanished.
Inactive coalitions. This is not the first
study to recognize a lack of collaboration
among DC agencies and organizations. Respondents in interviews carried out by
LINC as part of this research, in fact, commonly mentioned that they, the Federal
Government, and various other national
organizations had separately sponsored
coalitions or task forces to spearhead efforts to pull youth-serving organizations in
DC together. Because many agencies and
organizations sponsoring coalitions in DC
have been unaware of one another's efforts,
DC has many coalitions, each with a relatively small number of participants and
most of which have failed to produce effective action plans. In addition, LINC
found, these coalitions often duplicate
one another's efforts and goals.

Lack of coordination. in Washington,
DC, the LINC study found, local government agencies are involved in very few
coordinated efforts to address the problems of juvenile crime, delinquency, and
violence. LINC's analysis showed that juvenile justice and other local government
agencies in nearby Northern Virginia and
suburban Maryland are working closely
with local youth organizations in those
areas, but that DC's government agencies
are trying to provide youth programs
themselves, rather than cooperating with
youth organizations experienced in programs and services to youth.

For example, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) in 1993 funded a limited number of cities to form coalitions to prevent
violence. Coalitions formed include the DC
Pulling American Communities Together
(PACT) Project, which brought a subset of
DC agencies together to discuss gaps in
services and design a strategic plan for
addressing those gaps. A high priority of
DC PACT was "to coordinate resources
and share information on local and federal
anti-violence efforts" (DC PACT, Undated).
Join Together, a Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation-funded project that was
founded in 1991 and is based in the Boston
University School of Public Health, was
formed to help communities bring about
concerted action to prevent violence and
substance abuse. With additional funding
from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, DC has been one of Join
Together's focal cities. Kids Count, funded
by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, was
designed to support communities around
the Nation, including DC, to measure and
report on the status of children (including
their involvement in violence and drug
use) in order to promote public action on
behalf of children locally.

LINC found that the DC Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD) staffs eight of
its own Boys Clubhouses. These clubs are

Although the efforts of PACT, Join Together, and Kids Count have resulted in
highly visible coalitions and concerted

The "Comparative Analysis" section
below discusses other barriers to the effective delivery of youth services by comparing DC with other cities and evaluating
how well the District is delivering services
and programs to youth.

strategies in places other than Washington,
DC, few administrators interviewed in DC
knew about these three organizations'
approaches, and none of the respondents
were aware of more than one of the approaches. Staff involved in bringing these
approaches to fruition in DC found the
experience disheartening because of key
agencies' unwillingness to cooperate.

Comparative Analysis
Process
After analyzing the data collected from
boys in the study sample and from youthserving organizations, LINC compared its
findings with those of studies of youth crime
and responses to youth violence in other
cities. At the time of the DC study, the author was involved in research on youth programs and violence prevention in several
cities around the Nation. Twelve of these
cities (each of which had been the subject of
previous research) were selected for comparison with DC. Three (Arlington, TX;
Bristol, CT; and Spokane, WA) were selected
by a panel of experts for their exemplary
approaches to youth crime and violence
prevention; four (Eureka, CA; Pocatello, 10;
Rapid City, SO; and Redding, CA) had been
involved in an ongoing partnership of law
enforcement agencies and researchers sponsored by the National Institute of Justice
(NI.I); and five (Beaufort and Summerville,
SC; Philadelphia, PA; and Salinas and San
Jose, CA) were cities in which a new violence intervention project (VIP) had recently
been piloted by the Girl Scouts of America
and evaluated by LINC. 18 The approaches to
preventing youth violence and furnishing
safe places for youth during the afterschool hours that were used in these 12 cities provided an instructive contrast to the
approaches employed in DC.
The comparison was carried out with
two questions in mind: (1) whether the
relatively high rates of youth violence in
DC were attributable to differences in patterns of delinquency among DC boys; and
(2) whether the high rates of youth violence were a product of the way that DC
organizations have dealt with children,
especially adolescent boys.
Patterns of youth delinquency in different cities have been the subject of criminological inquiry for more than 50 years.
Research in the area has included seminal
"Girl Scout VIP was piloted in other cities that did not
provide a reasonable basis for comparison with Washington, DC (Chaiken, 1998a).

studies in Denver, CO (Huizinga, 1998),
Philadelphia, PA (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin,
1972), Pittsburgh, PA (Browning and Loeber,
1999), and Rochester, NY (Thornberry and
Burch, 1997). As discussed above, the fundamental patterns of delinquency among
DC boys are very similar to those found
among boys in other cities. For example,
most DC boys reported committing at least
some minor acts of delinquency involving
defiance of authorities (such as drinking
alcohol without adult permission). As findings in other studies have also shown, some
DC boys were delinquent fighters but limited their criminal offenses to occasional
bouts of aggression. Like boys in other
cities, a relatively small proportion of DC
boys were the most delinquent in terms of
the seriousness, spectrum, and number of
crimes they committed.
Given the similarities between boys in
DC and boys in other cities, LINC considered whether the role of DC agencies and
organizations could be a factor in the
higher rates of violence among DC youth.

Discussion
In completing its comparative analysis
of findings in this study and findings in
studies of the 12 cities listed above, LINC
concluded that several obstacles stand in
the way of DC's effective delivery of youth
services. As a result of these obstacles, DC
adolescents at the highest risk of violence
and delinquency may not be receiving necessary support and services. In particular,
LINC's comparative analysis revealed two
barriers to the effective delivery of youth
services in DC: insufficient involvement of
Federal agencies and local businesses and
an excess number of unaffiliated and uncoordinated organizations.

Insufficient involvement of Federal
agencies and local businesses. LINC found
that in other cities, major industries and
high-level business executives play an
important part in meeting local needsincluding those of youth (Chaiken, 1998b).
Responding to increases in juvenile violence and crime, for example, business
leaders in other communities have taken
steps to ensure that the causes of the
violence are understood and that measures
for preventing violence and delinquency are
undertaken (Chaiken, 1998b). Many have
donated their time and skills or provided
incentives for staff members to work with
youth-serving organizations in roles ranging
from serving on local boards and commissions to volunteering at local schools to
leading afterschool programs at community
centers (Chaiken, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).
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The Federal Government is the District's
major industry. LINC's study found, however, that although Federal employees and
elected officials may live in the District
and possess valuable leadership and organizational skills that would be of help
to community-based organizations, many
are not personally involved in any youthserving or other civic organizations in DC.
Several rationales have been offered by
elected officials and Federal employees interviewed about this lack of involvement.
Congressional leaders and staff make clear
that their primary responsibility is to youth
in their own States, not children in DC.
Federal employees suggest-correctly or
incorrectly-that there is an implicit conflict of interest in providing personal attention to organizations that may receive Federal funds for youth activities. Others say
their role is to serve all of the Nation's
children-rather than those in a particular
city. Others offer the justification that attempts by Federal employees to bring
about change in DC would be resented as
interfering with home rule. Yet, from a comparative perspective, the major difference
between Federal agencies and private industry is that the latter realizes an economic benefit from actively promoting
strong programs for youth. In cities such
as Arlington, TX, chief executive officers
(CEO's) in private companies point out that
by solving youth problems and reducing
crime, their companies have a competitive
advantage in recruiting the best and brightest employees to move to and live in the
local area. They also realize that local
high-quality afterschool programs that
attract and supervise adolescents allow
employees with school-age children to
work without interruptions and more productively during the hours when school is
not in session. CEO's also view the good
will generated by encouraging employees
to play active roles in delivering services
to youth as a form of capital investment.
Excess number of unaffiliated organizations. In many cities, the majority of
organizations serving youth are members
or affiliates of larger "umbrella" organizations (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1998b). For example, a city may have a large number of
Boys & Girls Club programs, all of which
operate under the aegis of a regional office
of the Boys & Girls Clubs of America organization. Moreover, in cities such as Arlington, TX, and Spokane, WA, there is a high
degree of coordination among the various umbrella organizations. Together, the
organizations carve out niches of
expertise, plan services to ensure that

school-age children in all parts of the city
are served, and provide a selection of
interesting and educational activities
for young participants to choose from.
Affiliates also cooperate in citywide
assessments of children's needs and
support one another's fundraising
activities. In cities such as Bristol, CT,
these organizations work with the police
department and the schools to identify
youth who are getting into trouble because they are unsupervised; together,
these groups have developed a plan to
ensure that the identified youth are
brought into at least one organization and
are involved in skill-building activities.
In DC, no such cooperation is taking
place. Organizations have not carved out
different areas of expertise to address the
multiple needs of children in the District.
The ILJ update of the 1994 directory of
services showed high turnover of organizations receiving funds to provide youth
services. In interviews for this study,
administrators in unaffiliated organizations made clear that they found it Impossible to carve out a niche of expertise. To
continue to exist, administrators explained,
organizations needed to shift missions
when funding was lost and when additional funding became available.
Program funding, LINC found, appeared
to be based on hunches about the needs
of children in the District rather than a
common base of research. Some administrators, for example, knew about the DC
Kids Count program; most did not. Some
administrators described certain programs proudly as preventing delinquency
by building self-esteem or through athletic
activities, even though a growing body of
research suggests that such programs are
not effective (folan and Guerra, 1994). In
addition, DC funding was cut for the nationally affiliated Boys & Girls Clubs' Smart
Moves programs, even though these programs include components shown to reduce delinquency.

pelling need for early intervention. Many
cities have met this need by offering proven
programs such as Head Start and providing parenting classes and home visits to
youth at high risk of delinquency (Chaiken
and Huizinga, 1995).

+
+

Family members and other caregivers.
Neighbors working together in
community-based organizations.

+

Providing Structure and
Supervision

+

School staff members, including
administrators, teachers, a,nd guidance
counselors.
Staff and administrators of youth-serving
organizations that offer educational and
recreational programs for youth during
the afterschool hours.

Because of the high incidence of violence
committed by or against youth during
afterschool hours, many communities have
focused on providing supervision and structured activities-especially for children at
high risk for violence-during that time period (Chaiken, 1998b). The six recommendations below would address specific concerns relating to the lack of supervision for
boys in DC during the afterschool hours.
Bring boys under control of responsible adults. In many cities across the Nation, juvenile violence is declining (PoeYamagata, 1998; Fox and Zawitz, 1998). A
growing number of researchers and policy
analysts agree that the decline is largely
attributable to concerted community efforts to bring adolescents under the control of adults who have the authority to:

+

Policy Implications:
What Can Be Done for
Boys in DC?

+
+

Apply these sanctions immediately to
those who violate rules.

+

Make other youth aware of when and why
particular sanctions have been applied.

Providing Early Intervention
Although the youngest boys in the
sample were on average the least delinquent, some very young boys (13-year-olds)
reported seriously delinquent conduct. Such
conduct-together with a marked increase
in the seriousness of delinquent conduct
as boys get older-demonstrates a com-

Make and make known clear and specific rules for behavior.
Make and make known clear and fair
sanctions for breaking these rules.

The following adults in each community should work together and support
one another's efforts to bring children
under their control:

+

Police and other law enforcement
officers.
+ Probation officers, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and other professionals in
the juvenile justice system.
+ Staff of child welfare and protective
services agencies.
Channel energy into productive activities. Many cities have moved beyond
simply controlling delinquent behavior
to channeling the energy of youth into
productive activities-including crime
reduction activities. Under the supervision of adults skilled in guiding them,
young people are taking the lead In
projects such as neighborhood cleanups,
vandalism and graffiti removal projects,
Neighborhood Watch programs, community pride days, and cross-age tutoring
and mentoring programs for younger children (Chaiken, 1998b). Recent research
shows that participation in these activities reduces teen pregnancy and substance
abuse more than standard educational
approaches to delinquency reduction
(Allen eta!., 1997). Caring adults-parents,
other caregivers, and staff in local unaffiliated youth organizations-provide a
tremendous potential resource for controlling and guiding youth.

A growing body of research, however,
also shows that not all afterschool programs are effective at preventing violence
and delinquency (folan and Guerra, 1994).
In fact, sports, one of the most widely provided afterschool activities for adolescent
boys, was shown to have little or no positive effect on violence or other forms of
delinquent behavior. Rather than focusing
on athletic activities, therefore, policymakers may want to provide programs
shown to be effective at reducing delinquent behavior (for example, programs
intended to teach cognitive skills).
In attempting to channel youth's energy
in a positive direction, policymakers should
also aim to convince DC boys that their
earning power in the long run will be higher
if they pursue legal money-earning activities in their spare time. By doing so, DC
may be able to use the boys' strong economic motivations as an incentive for positive rather than antisocial behavior. In
Redding, CA, for example, police officers
have capitalized on boys' economic motivations by giving groups of youth "COPS
dollars" when they complete projects to
improve their neighborhoods. Endorsed
by local merchants, COPS dollars can be
redeemed at restaurants and other businesses popular with community youth. As
a result of this program, boys in blighted
areas who used to hang out and get into
trouble are removing litter, cleaning up
vacant lots, and creating play and recreation areas for themselves and younger
children. Judging from their willingness to
approach officers and ask what needs to
be done in return for COPS dollars, boysin addition to the police, businesses, and
other residents-favor this approach. 19

Adjust police patrols. Another action
that DC may take to reduce violence and
delinquency during afterschool hours is
increasing the number of police patrols
during the hours that area schools release
students. Although one additional patrol
car is not likely to have a major impact on
levels of afterschool violence, several officers walking the streets and talking to
students as they leave school have been
effective in other cities. In Eureka, CA, for
example, a growing number of assaults involving youth (including drive-by shootings
near one school) were essentially eliminated
after the police department appointed an
experienced officer to serve as a schoolbased youth/ethnic liaison officer. During
19
Based on observations and interviews being carried
out as part of NJJ-sponsored LINC project 95-JJ-CX-D04 7.

school hours, this officer works in partnership with administrators, counselors, and
teachers to reduce truancy and other
harmful behavior through a combination
of teaching, counseling, and coordinated
case management. During school breaks
and before and after school hours, the officer patrols the streets surrounding the
school and stays in radio contact with
school staff monitoring school property
and nearby areas. 20
Other cities' patrol plans have involved
not only the police, but neighbors, local
business owners, and youth organizations,
in an effort to minimize the chance that
releasing large groups of students into the
community at the same time each day will
result in fights or violence (Chaiken, 1998b).
Steps taken in other cities include having
adults with police walkie-talkies patrol
streets near schools each day during arrival and departure times, keeping students engaged in constructive afterschool
activities, and transporting students directly home following these activities (by
which time children's parents or other
caregivers will have returned home from
work) (Chaiken, 1998b).

Involve national organizations. A
survey of seven national youth-serving
organizations revealed that such organizations are reaching significantly larger
numbers of children at high risk of violence and delinquency in cities other than
DC (Chaiken, 1998b). According to the
survey, nationally affiliated organizations in
other cities are providing constructive activities at the very time children are most
at risk for violence in most parts of the
country-the afterschool hours. Increasing
the involvement of the many local chapters
and affiliates of national youth organizations in the District is essential to reducing
youth violence and delinquency in DC.
Involve local organizations. As the
Nation's Capital, Washington, DC, is home
to numerous private foundations, firms,
Federal agencies, and universities that have
spent large sums of money on research,
demonstration projects, and evaluations
focused on determining what works and
what does not work in preventing juvenile
violence and delinquency and promoting
the healthy and safe development of youth.
In fighting violence and juvenile delinquency, the DC community needs to tap into
the knowledge, experience, and resources
of all of these organizations and enlist their
20
Based on observations and interviews being carried
out as part of NIJ-sponsored LINC project 95-IJ-CX-D047.
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support and active involvement in providing
structure and supervision to youth.

Address needs of expelled and suspended students. As a result of high rates
of suspension and expulsion in DC, large
numbers of boys are released into the community without supervision. Without supervision and structured activities, many of
these boys are committing delinquent acts.
Both to protect the community and to meet
the needs of expelled and suspended students, parents, school administrators, government agencies, and youth-serving organizations in DC need to explore ways to
deliver safe and meaningful activities to
these students during school hours. In cities such as Pocatello, ID, and Eureka, CA,
youth who are removed from traditional
classrooms because of disruptive behavior
are placed in alternative classes with fewer
students and with teachers specifically
trained to address behavior problems.
Rather than allowing students to wander
the streets unsupervised, these communities are providing increased supervision. In
Pocatello, the community is also securing and
seeking the enforcement of injunctions that
prohibit students from gathering together
outside a school setting during school hours.

Applying Swift and
Sure Sanctions
As shown by LINC's study, a small number of youth in the three DC study neighborhoods are responsible for a large proportion of the crime and violence. To
combat youth violence and crime, authorities need to apply swift and sure sanctions
to the city's most serious juvenile offenders. These offenders need to be identified
and informed of the sanctions for specific
categories of delinquent behavior (both
for themselves and for any "crews," gangs,
groups of friends, or other individuals who
act as accessories). In addition, because
serious offenders should be sanctioned
immediately after committing delinquent
acts, the cumbersome process of handling
juveniles in courts and corrections must
be streamlined.
An immediate and substantial response
by the criminal justice system to delinquent
acts can effectively control serious offenders' worst behavior. In Boston, MA, for example, Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies have worked together to
crack down on illegal gun markets, and
local agencies have made a concerted effort
to identify and control the city's most violent youth (including gang members). As a
result of these efforts, escalating rates of
youth violence dropped precipitously. To

carry out a Boston-type effort and get serious juvenile offenders under control, DC will
need the same cooperation among community groups, law enforcement officers, and
juvenile justice agencies that took place in
Boston and surrounding communities
(Kennedy, 1998).
This type of community action presents
an opportunity for DC and its police department to reorganize immediately-and for a
cause that is likely to enjoy the community's
full support. It also creates an opportunity
for Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the
U.S. Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to act as partners in support
of the MPD. At the same time, it allows researchers who have studied effective approaches in other cities to provide practical
advice to policymakers about the resources,
tactics, and personnel needed to apply swift
and sure sanctions to the small number of
serious and violent juvenile offenders in DC.
By sending a clear message that violence
and the use of weapons will not be tolerated
and applying sanctions immediately for
delinquent acts, DC may encourage its
most serious juvenile offenders and their
friends to pursue noncriminal activities.

Reducing Gun Violence
Strategies for reducing youth violence
involving guns include making guns safer,
making them less available, and influencing
how youth use them (Mercy and Rosenberg,
1998). Although the first strategy requires
technological advances, recent research
has revealed a promising measure for reducing gun availability (and, in turn, reducing the number of fatalities and injuries
resulting from fights or incidents involving guns) (Kennedy, 1998). Recent research
has also revealed a way to affect teens' willingness to stop carrying guns. These measures are described below.
Identify and shut down suppliers. Working with local police departments in a number of areas, including DC, ATF has traced
guns being used by youth and found that
in most cities, guns are being supplied by a
limited number of out-of-State gun dealers
(Kennedy, 1998). Once identified, some gun
suppliers have been closed down. Continued collaboration with ATF is well advised.
Enlist the boys' help in reducing gun
use. A substantial body of research reveals
that in violent neighborhoods, boys carry
guns for protection primarily because
other boys or men carry guns (Mercy and
Rosenberg, 1998). To break this cycle of

violence, policymakers need to convince
boys that if they stop carrying guns, others
will do so too. In neighborhoods such as
Arlington, TX, youth workers have found
that teens are most likely to stop carrying
guns when they are involved in the process
of deciding when and where police will enjoin weapon carrying, how the prohibitions
will be monitored, and what sanctions will
be applied for violations (Chaiken, 1998b).
In cities such as Boston, MA (Kennedy,
1998), New York, NY (Bruce Johnson, National
Development & Research Institutes, Inc.,
1997, personal communication), and
Redding, CA, 21 groups of boys previously
involved in violence were Informed by
police and other juvenile justice agencies
of steps that would be taken to control
the entire group if any boy in the group
violated any gun laws. Such crackdowns
rapidly led to self-policing on the part of
formerly violent groups-and a rapid
reduction in the number of gun fatalities
in those cities (Kennedy, 1998).

Improving Coordination
Between government agencies and private organizations. Realizing that, under
the current organizational structure in DC,
no single agency can deal with the many
aspects of youth development and the many
causes of delinquency, government agencies
in the city, including schools, the police department, and child welfare and protective
services agencies, should work together
and reach out to private organizations to
address problems collectively (Chaiken,
1998b). Representatives from these agencies
and organizations, as in other cities, could
come together to propose and implement
coordinated action plans to help both individual children in trouble and small groups
of children who may be experiencing or
causing problems in their neighborhoods
or schools. The combined expertise of representatives from different organizations
serves children and their communities well.
Among local affiliates of national organizations. Affiliation with national organizations sustains access to proven programs
and materials designed by youth development professionals and evaluated by researchers. Executive directors of affiliates of
national youth organizations typically work
together on an ongoing basis to define the
niche that each will fill (Chaiken, 1998b).
Although they may not share specific program materials, organizations often share
space, keep one another informed of emerg21
Data collected by LINC as part of NIJ grant
95-IJ-CX-0047.

ing problems facing youth, and support one
another's fundraising activities. Officers of
different affiliates of national organizations
may serve on local boards and commissions
together, along with key members of the
business community and top administrators
of local government agencies. Absent coordination with one another and oversight of a
national organization, organizations may
duplicate efforts or fail to use funds for
direct services to youth. Each unaffiliated
organization, for example, needs funds to
support costly administrative functions,
facility maintenance, preparation of grant
proposals, and other fundraising activities.
As a result of collaboration among nonprofit youth organizations in many cities,
adolescents in poor neighborhoods (those
most vulnerable to delinquency) have access to a variety of afterschool programs
such as computer classes, drama activities,
and tutoring. These programs help youth
build skills that in the short term prevent
delinquency and that in the long term may
promote a successful transition to productive adulthood (Chaiken, 1998c). Given the
lack of such coordination in DC, children
from the three neighborhoods studied have
had access to few such programs.

Conclusion
As reflected by this study's findings, violence by juveniles in DC is far from random.
Regular patterns exist as to where and when
it takes place and what types of boys are
committing violent acts. These patterns are
essentially the same as those found in other
cities-including many that have made major strides in reducing juvenile violence in a
relatively short period of time.

With resources equal to or greater
than those of cities that have implemented
effective juvenile crime prevention programs, Washington, DC, should look to the
success of other cities and begin implementing similar programs for its own
youth. Beginning in the most violent neighborhoods, DC should develop an action plan
for bringing delinquent boys under control.
With violence and crime in these areas controlled, the city could then work on a more
comprehensive strategy for delinquency prevention and youth development. Any such
strategy, however, will require the concerted
efforts of a variety of community members
and organizations. Only by coordinating
efforts-across agencies, organizations,
schools, and even neighborhood lines-will
DC address and eliminate the most serious
patterns of delinquency and control the most
delinquent youth.
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